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Although most of the chapters of the book have been previously 
published as autonomous journal papers, they all constitute a 
highly unified argumentative line defending musical formalism 
and realism as regards the aesthetic properties of music. 
Zangwill’s proposal of restating Hanslick’s thesis on the 
essentially autonomous nature of musical beauty comes together 
with a theory on the role of emotion vocabulary in describing 
music, and the relation between the literal meaning of such 
terms and their non-literal use when they indicate genuine 
musical qualities. Agreeing with Scruton on the irreducibility of 
musical metaphors, Zangwill proposes and defends a realist 
alternative to Scruton’s and Levinson’s fictionalism. His theory 
thus combines three views: formalism, essential non-literalism 
of discourse on music, and aesthetic realism. 
The book is forthright and well articulated in its theoretical aims 
and strategies. Zangwill examines the essence of music, what 
makes music valuable to us for its own sake and how any other 
values that music can acquire (semantic, political, social) are 
conditioned. He strives for a theory addressing the general, 
fundamental questions on what music is: in his view, this 
question is not only not reducible to questions about what music 
does or why it is exercised, but has an epistemic priority over 
them. This philosophical attitude in search of the essence of 
music should not be taken as a “dull definitional project”. What 
it aims at is the “phenomenon in the world” (p.22), not the word 
or concept we apply to it; this is a debatable ambition. 
The book’s clear-cut self-enclosed dialectic firmness comes at a 
cost: Zangwill is astonishingly parsimonious when it comes to 
considering actual music: very few musical examples are given 
and even those serve only as recurrent illustrations; they are not 
analysed as sources of genuine musical insight. The author 
anticipates criticism in this regard, stating that his aim is not to 
“impress with his knowledge of music”, but to “maximize the 
number of readers who know the examples” (p.XII), which 
seems an awkward thing to say in a book the “central topic” of 
which is “the aesthetic experience of music” (p.168). 
The volume consists of ten chapters, two appendices and a coda, 
comprising its three parts: Music and Emotion, Describing 
Music and Musical Experience. The rich Introduction includes a 
useful concise summary of its contents. The unity of the book is 
of a conceptual kind, as each of the three parts works on 
different aspects of the same general theory: this is why the 
recurrence of its central ideas and some iterations contribute to 
its clarity, rather than irritate the reader. I will now attempt to 
discuss some of these points. 
The classic problem of emotion in music is the critical core of 
the work. In the first part Zangwill, following Hanslick, argues 
that music in itself essentially “has nothing to do with emotion” 
(p.27). The subsequent two parts develop a theory of describing 
music and the nature of the “proper musical experience” in the 
light of this fundamental negative thesis. “Music should be 
understood in its own terms and not reduced to something else” 
(p.1). And if it is able to arouse emotions in us, to express them 
or mime their effects in the case of vocal or dramatic music, it 
can do so only by virtue of its autonomous, non-reducible 
aesthetic properties. How can we explain standard emotional 
descriptions of music? What do we really refer to when we 
speak of anguished flamenco, proud pasodoble or an angry 
passage in Beethoven’s Ninth? According to Zangwill, nothing 
genuinely emotional. 
The author characterizes central cases of emotion in terms of (1) 
mental states (2) felt by a person (3) which have intentional 
content, (4) qualitative nature (5) and are subject to rational 
requirements (which might not be fulfilled, thus making a 
particular emotion irrational; cf. p.44). Clearly, not being a 
person, music cannot (a) possess emotion; but neither can it 
stand to emotion in more complex relations, traditionally 
deployed in explaining the essential power of music. It is not 
about (b) arousing emotions because, when we listen to music, 
we have music as the intentional object of our experience; and 
music is arguably not a proper intentional object of most 
ordinary emotions, such as pride, fear or despair. So, if we 
genuinely fear something while listening to music, we are 
probably being distracted from it; a composer might feel pride 
while listening to his own work, but that pride has nothing to do 
with the “emotional” character of the piece of music in question 
(perhaps we would rather describe it as shy or hesitant). All the 
more, our emotional responses to music may diverge greatly – 
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yet they may all be rooted in the genuine experience of music. 
The experience itself is prior to the emotional reaction it 
eventually produces. The same may be said of the objectless 
moods it may induce in listeners. Music can (c) express 
emotions in the purely causal sense, being an actual expression 
of the musician’s emotional state, but this is aesthetically 
irrelevant; other ways of explaining the musical expression of 
emotions, including a hypothesis modeled on the notion of 
arational actions, ultimately turn out to be susceptible to 
criticism. Zangwill refuses to see music’s power in (d) 
representing emotions, because of the radical dissimilarity 
between the object and the means of representation thereof (this 
point is in striking contrast to many other views on music – 
including, most famously – Aristotle’s, who emphasizes the 
similarity between emotions and the sonic motions of musical 
elements (cf. Arist. Pol. 1340a, W.H. Wackenroder or S. 
Langer). If “proud Spanish brass band music” (this, it seems, is 
Zangwill’s way of referring to the expressive character of 
pasodoble) represented pride, it would have to represent 
someone’s (perhaps a bullfighter’s) object of that pride, which it 
naturally cannot do. Therefore it cannot represent emotion. 
Lastly, Zangwill discards the theories of music as (e) 
symbolising emotion as “hopeless” (p.37), taking into account 
only arbitrary symbolic connections (presentational symbols are 
not discussed). 
Apart from this main discussion, Zangwill offers some standard 
critical remarks on attempts to study emotion in music 
empirically: he proposes a methodological bridge indicating the 
conditions of relevance of empirical data to philosophical 
questions on music. Somewhat surprisingly, he argues against 
the indirect emotion theories from the (1) parity of experience of 
music by autistic and non-autistic people, and (2) the inequality 
of their capacities in terms of “emotion understanding, 
imagination and description” (p.75). The first premise is 
assumed to be supported by the lack of significant differences in 
galvanic skin response (GSR), indicating “general physiological 
arousal” between the respective groups of subjects exposed to 
music. It may be objected that we cannot exclude the possibility 
that what is captured by this method is not “the musical 
experience, whatever it is” (p.72) in its entirety, but the purely 
pathological (in Kant's and Hanslick’s sense) effect of music, 
perhaps even the same which makes cows produce more milk 
(p.30) or calms them in the slaughterhouse (Sève 2013, p.82). 
Zangwill also states that, if some recent results showing 
enhanced GSR in groups of autistic persons were true, it would 
only strengthen the argument. However, again, a rival 
explanation – that people with autism, failing to recognize 
emotional content, respond more vividly on a pathological level 
– cannot be ruled out on purely empirical bases. 
Criticising literalism, the doctrine that the emotion descriptions 
of music refer to emotional mental states, Zangwill notes that we 
also apply such descriptions to natural phenomena, speaking of 
“proud rocks” or “angry clouds”. But, in the case of nature, 
these terms do not literally ascribe any emotional properties to 
inanimate objects. Therefore, the prevalence of emotion 
vocabulary by itself proves nothing. We speak of “balanced” or 
“delicate” music, we inevitably describe music in terms of 
motion and height: these are metaphors which have nothing to 
do with emotion (cf. Zuckerkandl’s view denying any literal 
movement in music, developed in Scruton 1998). It is 
reasonable to seek a unitary account of such non-literal 
descriptions. According to the Interweaving Thesis, “emotion 
descriptions of music are intimately connected with other 
descriptions that are obviously metaphorical” (pp.43-44). On the 
premise that a unitary account is desirable, Zangwill 
controversially criticizes S. Davies’ view that expressions such 
as “sad” or “high” are dead metaphors and apply literally to 
music in a secondary, specifically musical sense; but Davies still 
counts as a non-literalist in Zangwill’s terms, as the secondary 
meanings of the emotion terms in question do not refer to mental 
states.  
The ubiquitous emotion descriptions of music can be explained 
by the Aesthetic Metaphor Thesis, according to which they “are 
metaphorical descriptions of aesthetic properties” (p.41). This 
position is developed and reinforced as the Essential Metaphor 
Thesis, according to which “the aesthetic properties of music 
cannot be literally described” (p.95). The interesting 
considerations on ineffabilism, ecstasy, (this-worldly) 
mysticism, immanentism, negative theology and Jewish thought 
correlated with this view (pp.112-118) make the reader think of 
Jankélévitch (1961) who, however, is not even mentioned. 
Zangwill stands for the Aesthetic Theory of Music: “the 
function of music is to generate aesthetic properties that depend 
on sounds” (p.47). He applies to music his own general account 
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(cf. Zangwill 2001), according to which aesthetic verdictive 
properties (beauty/ugliness) depend on aesthetic substantive 
properties (described literally as elegance, dumpiness or, 
metaphorically, as sadness, fury), which in turn depend on non-
aesthetic properties (of physical and other kinds). 
In this framework, the “negative emotion paradox” (cf. 
Levinson 2011) is resolved. It can no more puzzle us that we 
enjoy anxious, melancholy or mournful music, as these terms 
identify the ways in which a particular piece is musically 
beautiful, and this pleases us. (Dissolving the paradox is not 
necessarily a theoretical merit; perhaps it proves the theory of 
being problem-blind, as all it achieves is to show that this classic 
Aristotelian question cannot arise in the true experience of 
music).  
What moves us in music are not emotions, nor any other content, 
but pure musical beauty. Whenever we experience it, we 
represent music as “possessing genuine aesthetic properties” 
(p.175). Zangwill defends this realist thesis and claims that it 
provides the best explanation for the normative aspirations of 
the judgment of taste, better than Hume’s, Kant’s and Scruton’s 
accounts. 
Zangwill’s book is valuable as an exhaustive and entertaining 
exposition of his distinctive philosophical views on music. It is, 
however, a highly theoretical construction, collocated in the 
most recent, specialized debate in the restricted circle of 
English-speaking scholars. It offers thorough discussions of 
Scruton (passim, notably Ch.9) and M. Budd (Ch.4 – a causal 
account for the possession of aesthetic/nonaesthetic concepts; 
Ch.5 – further polemics on the Essential Metaphor Thesis), 
Levinson, Kivy, S. Davies, D. Davidson. A non-standard 
interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument is 
given in Ch.5. Other authors, with some exceptions (Hume), are 
mostly treated as emblems of broadly intended positions 
(Aristotle, St. Thomas), as objects of uninteresting repeated 
general attacks (the case of Adorno), or as fruitful inspirations 
for Zangwill’s own thought (Kant, Hanslick), rather than objects 
of historically accurate study and contextual scrutiny. Yet one 
can hardly imagine a clearer and more comprehensively argued 
statement of musical formalism, realism and non-literalism in 
up-to-date philosophical terms. 
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